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Abstract
That paper provides an overview of the economics of sports mega-events as well as
review of the existing literature in the field. The paper describes why boosters’ ex ante estimates
of the economic impact of large sporting events tend to exaggerate the net economic benefits of
these events and surveys the results of a large number of ex post studies of exploring the true
impact of mega-events.
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Introduction 
  Sports boosters often claim that major sporting events, so-called “mega-events,” inject 
large sums of money into the cities lucky enough to host them. Promoters envision hoards of 
wealthy sports fans descending on a city’s hotels, restaurants, and businesses, and showering 
them with fistfuls of dollars. For example, the National Football League (NFL) typically claims 
an economic impact from the Super Bowl of around $300 to $400 million
1, Major League 
Baseball (MLB) attaches a $75 million benefit to the All-Star Game
2, and up to almost $250 
million for the World Series
3, and the estimated effect of the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) Men’s Basketball Final Four ranges from $30 million
4 to $110 million
5. 
Multi-day events such as the summer or winter Olympics or soccer’s World Cup produce even 
larger figures. See Table 1 for a list of published economic impact estimates for a variety of large 
sporting events.   
  Of course, leagues, team owners, and event organizers have a strong incentive to provide 
economic impact numbers that are as large as possible in order to justify heavy public subsidies. 
The NFL and MLB use the Super Bowl and baseball’s All-Star Game as carrots to prompt 
otherwise reluctant city officials and taxpayers to provide lavish funding for new stadiums to the 
great financial benefit of the existing owners. For example, in baseball, of the 15 new major 
league stadiums built between 1970 and 1997, 13 were selected by MLB to host an All-Star 
Game within five years of their construction
6. Similarly, during a visit to the Dallas-Fort Worth 
area just before a crucial vote on public funding for a new stadium, NFL Commissioner Paul 
Tagliabue suggested that the construction of a new stadium would lead to the opportunity for the 
metro area to host the Super Bowl in the next decade. Since the NFL touts economic benefits 
from hosting the Super Bowl of $300 to $400 million, an amount that meets or exceeds the   3
proposed $325 million public subsidy for the stadium, in effect, Commissioner Tagliabue was 
saying that combined with a Super Bowl, Arlington would be getting a new stadium for free.
  With an event like the Olympics, the huge cost of hosting the event to the standards now 
required by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), as well as providing adequate security, 
almost necessitates an infusion of taxpayer money. For example, while on paper the 2002 Winter 
Olympics in Salt Lake City made a profit, the cost figures did not include millions of dollars of 
additional security provided by the U.S. Department of Defense at no cost to the local organizing 
committee. For the 2004 Summer Games, the government in Athens spent $1.5 billion on 
security alone. These figures illustrate why organizers often rely on lofty reports that promise 
huge monetary windfalls to host cities. Since many economic impact studies are commissioned 
by owners, leagues, or event organizers, which stand to directly benefit from the public subsidies 
such reports are designed to elicit, one must question whether such studies can be believed. 
 
Ex ante economic modeling and its deficiencies 
  A typical predictive, or ex ante, economic impact study of the type used by event 
promoters estimates the number of visitors an event is expected to draw, the number of days each 
spectator is expected to stay, and the amount each visitor will spend each day. Combining these 
figures, an estimate of the “direct economic impact” is obtained. This direct impact is then 
subjected to a multiplier, usually around two, to account for the initial round of spending 
recirculating through the economy. This additional spending is known as “indirect economic 
impact.” Thus, the total economic impact is double the size of the initial spending. 
  For example, in assessing the impact of Super Bowl XXVIII on the City of Atlanta and 
the State of Georgia, Jeffrey Humphreys (1994) estimated that the event created 2,736 jobs and   4
had an impact of $166 million on the Georgia economy
7.  Of the $166 million, Humphreys 
estimated direct and indirect economic impact of $76 and $90 million, respectively.  The direct 
impact was derived from estimating the number of “visitor days” (306,680) and multiplying that 
statistic by the average estimated per diem expenditures per visitor ($252).  The indirect or 
induced economic impact was estimated using the Regional Input-Output Multiplier System 
(RIMS II) model developed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  More recent NFL’s estimates 
of the economic impact of the Super Bowl arrive at figure roughly double that of Humphrey’s 
1994 study in part due to general inflation in the economy, but most of the difference is a result 
of increases in the assumed number of visitors and the daily spending attributable to each of 
them.  
  While such an estimation method is relatively straight-forward, academic economists 
have been quick to point out the failings of such ex ante studies as they often rely on poor 
methodology and also suffer from several theoretical problems. 
  First, many booster estimates are wildly optimistic about the number of potential guests 
and their spending habits. In March 2005, Denver tourism officials predicted 100,000 visitors for 
the National Basketball Association (NBA) All-Star Game. Considering that the Pepsi Center, 
the game’s venue, only holds 20,000 fans, and that Denver has only about 6,000 hotel rooms, it 
is not clear exactly how such an influx of basketball fans would be even be possible much less 
probable. 
  Similarly, in other cases, the size of the estimates themselves strain credulity. The Sports 
Management Research Institute estimated the direct economic benefits of the U.S. Open Tennis 
tournament in Flushing Meadows, New York at $420 million for the tri-state area, more than any 
other sports or entertainment event in any city in the United States. This sum represents 3% of   5
the total annual direct economic impact of tourism for New York
8. It is simply impossible to 
believe that 1 in 30 tourists to New York City in any given year are visiting the city solely to 
attend the U.S. Open. The projected $6 billion impact of the World Cup proposed for South 
Africa in 2006 suggested that soccer games and their ancillary activities would have represented 
over 4 percent of the entire gross domestic product of the country in that year
9. Along the same 
lines, a study by the Dentsu Institute for Human Studies estimated a $24.8 billion impact from 
the 2002 World Cup for Japan and an $8.9 billion impact for South Korea
10.  As a percentage of 
total national income, these figures represent 0.6 and 2.2 percent of the total Japanese and South 
Korean economies, respectively.  
  In other cases, the variation in estimated benefits alone is enough to question the validity 
of the studies. A series of studies of the NBA All-Star game produced numbers ranging from a 
$3 million windfall for the 1992 game in Orlando to a $35 million bonanza for the game three 
years earlier in Houston
11. Similarly, the 1997 NCAA Women’s Basketball Final Four was 
estimated to have an economic impact of $7 million on the local economy of Cincinnati, but the 
same event was predicted to produce a $32 million impact on the San Jose economy just two 
years later
12. The five- or ten-fold disparity in the estimated impact for the same annual event 
serves to illustrate the ad hoc nature of these studies. In some cases, economic impact figures 
appear to be completely fabricated. While city or league officials may suggest a certain monetary 
figure from a particular event, when pressed on the details, the “missing study” syndrome 
arises
13. 
  Sports boosters also often cite civic pride or national exposure as a primary benefit of 
mega-events and of sports in general. In many cases, it is undoubtedly true that mega-events 
bring intangible psychological value to the communities that host them. The 1995 Rugby World   6
Cup in South Africa represented an opportunity for the country to announce its re-emergence as 
a full member of not only the world’s sporting community but also its political community. The 
picture of South African President Nelson Mandela wearing the jersey of the white South 
African captain Francois Pienaar while presenting him with the championship trophy was a 
powerful image to the world indicating that South Africa had emerged from its years of racial 
oppression and served to unify the country
14. Similarly, Ray Nagin, the mayor of New Orleans, 
pointed to the return of the NFL to the city in September 2006 as an important symbol to the rest 
of the country that the city was fully on the road to recovery from Hurricane Katrina which had 
devastated the city the year previously.  
  Obviously, measuring such benefits is fraught with difficulty, and academic studies are 
mixed on the subject. Most researchers find no correlation between economic growth and the 
presence of new sports facilities, franchises, or events suggesting that the intangible value of 
these events tends not to translate into any measurable benefits to the host cities. (See, for 
example, Robert Baade
15, Dennis Coates and Brad Humphreys
16, and Phil Porter
17.) On the other 
hand Coates and Humphreys did find that cities that win the Super Bowl (not the host cities) tend 
to experience a statistically significant increase in their per capita incomes following the game, a 
result they attribute to higher productivity due to a happier labor force
18. In other words, it is 
certainly possible that something intangible (happiness) can produce something tangible 
(productivity and real income). Coates and Humphreys’ claim of higher per capita personal 
incomes in winning cities, however, has been at least in part refuted by Victor Matheson
19. 
  At least one study by Gerald Carlino and Edward Coulson has found that rental housing 
prices are higher in cities with professional sports teams indicating a higher willingness of buyers 
to pay for housing in cities with these amenities
20, and this idea could, in theory, be applied to   7
cities that host mega-events as well. Dennis Coates, Brad Humphreys and Andrew Zimbalist, 
however, have suggested that Carlino and Coulson’s results are highly susceptible to the model 
specification used in estimating the results
21. It is also clearly true that cities with professional 
teams, since they are generally larger metropolitan areas, also can offer many other cultural 
attractions besides professional sports in comparison to smaller cities which may also contribute 
to the higher willingness to pay for housing in these cities. 
  Of course, the use of sporting events to provide entertainment for the masses has been 
around for centuries. The term “bread and circuses” dates from the first century Roman empire 
where extravagant games were held in conjunction with giveaways of subsidized food in order to 
pacify the citizenry and reduce urban unrest. 
  The other major intangible benefit of mega-events claimed by sports boosters is that of 
national and international exposure. Sports fans may enjoy their visit to the city and return later 
raising future tourist revenues for the area. Corporate visitors, it is claimed, may relocate 
manufacturing facilities and company headquarters to the city. Television viewers might decide 
to take a trip to the host city at some time in the future based on what they see during the 
broadcast of the mega-event. Finally, hosting a major event might raise perception of the city so 
that it becomes a “major league” or “world class” city and travel destination. All of these claims 
are potential true although little empirical research has conclusively demonstrated any long-run 
connections between hosting mega-events and future tourism demand. There are not even any 
anecdotal examples of companies moving corporate operations to a city based on the hosting of a 
sporting event.  
  While intangible benefits to mega-events certainly exist, two caveats must be mentioned. 
First, the presence of a mega-event may bring with it intangible costs as well as benefits. For   8
example, the publicity associated with a sporting event may not always place a city in a positive 
light. Following the riots that occurred during the National Basketball Association finals in 
Detroit in the early 1990s, the city’s national image basked in the glow of car fires and burning 
buildings rather than the goodwill associated with an NBA championship, and the bribery 
scandal that surrounded the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City certainly didn’t enhance the 
city’s reputation. Similarly, the international reputations Munich and Atlanta were tarnished by 
the terrorist events that occurred during the Olympic Games held in their respective cities.  
  In addition, if the lion’s share of the benefits of an event is intangible, this is a significant 
cause for concern since this type of benefit is most likely to be based upon assumption and 
guesswork. While sports boosters often suggest that the exposure a city receives during a mega-
event is invaluable to the area, in the words of University of Chicago economist Allen 
Sanderson, “Anytime anybody uses the word ‘invaluable,’ they are usually too lazy to measure it 
or they don’t want to know the answer.”  
 Even  when  ex ante studies are done carefully and considered manner, they suffer from 
three primary theoretical deficiencies: the substitution effect, crowding out, and leakages. The 
substitution effect occurs when consumers spend money at a mega-event rather than on other 
goods and services in the local economy. A local resident who goes to an All-Star Game when it 
is in town is spending money at the game that likely would have been spent locally elsewhere in 
the absence of the game. Therefore, the local consumer’s spending on a sporting event is not new 
economic activity, rather a reshuffling of local spending. For this reason, most economists 
advocate that spending by local residents be excluded from any economic impact estimates.  
  Even including only out-of-region visitors in impact studies may still result in inflated 
estimates if a large portion of the non-local fans at a game are “casual visitors,” that is out-of-  9
town guests who go to a sporting event, but are visiting the host city for reasons other than the 
sporting event itself. For example, college professor at an academic conference may buy a ticket 
to a local game, and therefore the ticket would be counted as a direct economic impact of the 
sports contest. The professor, however, would have come to the city and spent money on hotels 
and restaurants in the absence of the sporting match, and again the money spent at the game 
substitutes for money that would have spent elsewhere in the local economy.  
 Similarly,  ex ante estimates may be biased upwards if event guests engage in “time-
switching,” which occurs when a traveler rearranges a planned visit to a city to coincide with a 
mega-event. One example of time-switching is someone who has always wanted to visit Hawaii 
who plans a trip during the NFL’s Pro-Bowl. While the Pro-Bowl did influence the tourist’s 
decision about when to come, it did not affect the decision whether to come. Therefore total 
tourism spending in Hawaii is unchanged; the Pro-Bowl simply affects the timing of such 
spending. 
  In the case of mega-events, the amount of new spending that is new to the economy is 
thought to be quite large in comparison to the total amount of spending, since these “premier” 
events are thought to attract large audiences from outside the local economy, many of whom 
come specifically for the event. Whereas 5 percent to 20 percent of fans at a typical MLB game 
are visitors from outside the local metropolitan area, the percentage of visitors at an event like an 
All-Star Game or the Super Bowl is thought to be much higher
22. High prices charged by hotels 
and other businesses in the hospitality industry also tend to dissuade casual visitors during mega-
events. 
  A second source of bias is “crowding out,” which is the congestion caused by a mega-
event that dissuades regular recreational and business visitors from coming to a city during that   10
time. Many large sporting events are staged in communities that are already popular tourist 
destinations. If hotels and restaurants in the host city normally tend to be at or near capacity 
throughout the time period during which the competition takes place, the contest may simply 
supplant rather than supplement the regular tourist economy. In other words, the economic 
impact of a mega-event may be large in a gross sense but the net impact may be small. Scores of 
examples of this phenomenon exist. As a case in point, during the 2002 World Cup in South 
Korea, the number of European visitors to the country was higher than normal, but this increase 
was offset by a similar sized decrease in number of regular tourists and business travelers from 
Japan who avoided South Korea due to World Cup hassles. The total number of foreign visitors 
to South Korea during the World Cup in 2002 was estimated at 460,000, an figure identical to 
the number of foreign visitors during the same period in the previous year
23. 
  A third source of bias comes from leakages. While money may be spent in local 
economies during mega-events, this spending may not wind up in the pockets of local residents. 
The taxes used to subsidize these events, however, are paid for by local taxpayers. The economic 
multipliers used in ex ante analyses are calculated using complex input-output tables for specific 
industries grounded in inter-industry relationships within regions based upon an economic area’s 
normal production patterns. During mega-events, however, the economy within a region may be 
anything but normal, and therefore, these same inter-industry relationships may not hold. Since 
there is no reason to believe that the usual economic multipliers are the same during mega-
events, any economic analyses based upon these multipliers may, therefore, be highly 
inaccurate
24.  
  In fact, there is substantial reason to believe that during mega-events, these multipliers 
are highly overstated, which overestimates the true impact of these events on the local economy.   11
Hotels, for example, routinely raise their prices during mega-events to three or four times their 
normal rates. The wages paid to a hotel’s workers, however, remain unchanged, and indeed 
workers may be simply expected to work harder during times of high demand without any 
additional monetary compensation. As a hotel’s revenue increases without a corresponding 
increase in costs, the return to capital (as a percentage of revenues) rises while the return to labor 
falls. Capital income is far less likely to stay within the area in which it is earned than labor 
income, and therefore, one might expect a fall in the multiplier effect during mega-events due to 
these increased leakages
25. 
  Most league-sponsored economic impact studies not only potentially exaggerate the 
benefit-side of the cost-benefit equation but also often completely ignore the costs of hosting 
such an event. Most leagues and event organizers require sparkling new stadiums and arenas 
before awarding the privilege of hosting a mega-event to a city. The NBA and MLB as well as 
the National Hockey League and Major League Soccer use their All-Star games to showcase new 
facilities and explicitly use the promise of hosting these events as an enticement to cities to build 
new stadiums and arenas. This is not a uniquely American phenomenon. Both the Summer and 
Winter Olympics routinely entail major construction projects as a condition of winning the bid. 
The Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), soccer’s world governing body, 
extracts similar promises of new stadiums from its host countries. Germany spent over 1.4 billion 
euros building or rehabilitating 12 stadiums for the 2006 FIFA World Cup of which at least 35 
percent was provided by local, state, and federal taxpayers
26. 
  It is a common error in cost benefit analysis for the costs of infrastructure improvements 
to be counted as a benefit and not a cost. While construction expenditures for sports 
infrastructure undoubtedly have stimulative effects on the economy, the opportunity cost of   12
capital must also be considered. Public expenditures on sports infrastructure and event operations 
necessarily entail reductions in other government services, an expansion of government 
borrowing, or an increase in taxation, all of which produce a drag on the local economy
27. At 
best public expenditures on sports-related construction or operation have zero net impact on the 
economy as the employment benefits of the project are matched by employment losses 
associated with higher taxes or spending cuts elsewhere in the system.  
  At worst, the spending on sports projects represents true costs. If specialized materials, 
labor, or technology must be obtained from outside the local economy, these expenditures result 
in an outflow of money away from the city. Furthermore, due to the distortions caused by the tax 
system, all funds raised by a local government to pay for stadium construction result in some 
level of dead-weight loss that can easily exceed $0.25 for every dollar spent.  Finally, even if all 
monies spent on construction stay in the local economy, there is nothing to suggest that stadium 
building is the best use of government funds and that the return on sports infrastructure exceeds 
the return on the next best alternative. In many cases, sports venues are often highly specialized 
facilities that have only limited use following an event. For example, what does one do with a 
world-class, 10,000 seat swimming facility once the Olympics are over? Indeed, unless a 
compelling case can be made that a local community is in dire need of fiscal stimulus and that no 
other projects exist that would provide a comparable return, infrastructure spending must be 
considered a cost and not a benefit. 
  Besides the infrastructure costs associated with hosting these games, sporting events and 
the crowds associated with them require government expenditures on public safety, sanitation 
and public transportation, and the larger the event the larger the potential costs. The variable 
costs borne by the host city are at least $1.5 million for the Super Bowl
28, and Greece spent over   13
$1.5 billion on security alone for the 2004 Summer Olympics. In addition, non-economic costs 
such as “traffic congestion, vandalism, environmental degradation, disruption of residents' 
lifestyle, and so on are rarely reported.”
29 Following championship matches, for example, 
informal celebrations all too frequently degenerate into riots resulting in violence and the 
destruction of property, which negatively affect productive activity in the short-run. The failure 
to account for the public costs associated with athletic contests serves to give an upwards bias to 
the reported net impact of these events. 
 While  ex ante estimates often do a credible job in determining the economic activity that 
occurs as a result of a mega-event and may also address the issue of the substitution effect by 
excluding spending by local residents, they generally do a poor job of accounting for crowding-
out and almost never acknowledge the problems associated with the application of incorrect 
multipliers. Of course, one solution to the criticisms of ex ante economic analysis is to simply 
perform better cost-benefit analysis that fully accounts for the costs involved and more 
thoroughly addresses the issues of appropriate multipliers, opportunity costs, and the substitution 
effects of mega-events.   
  Larry Dwyer, Peter Forsyth, and Ray Spurr estimate the economic impact of the Quantas 
Australian Grand Prix automobile race using both standard input-output analysis and a more 
sophisticated computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that better accounts for the 
theoretical deficiencies discussed previously. By the standard input-output analysis, the race 
increased real output by $112 million the state of New South Wales and $120.1 million the 
country as a whole while the CGE model presented much more modest figures of $56.7 million 
and $24.5 million for the state and country, respectively
30. 
   14
Ex Post studies of mega-events 
  While Dwyer, Forsyth, and Spurr advocate the use of CGE over simple input-output 
based models in generating economic impact estimates, they concede that any type of ex ante 
approach to requires making many heroic assumptions about the state of the economy and the 
response of host cities to mega-events. For this reason, other scholars have performed ex post 
studies of regions that have hosted large sporting event to examine whether the advertised ex 
ante estimates conform to ex post observations of the economic impact mega-events exert on 
their host cities. These ex post analyses generally confirm the criticisms of economic impact 
studies discussed previously finding that ex ante studies routinely exaggerate the benefit of 
mega-events often by up to a factor of 10.  
  Ex post analyses of mega-events are performed by examining the economic performance 
of a host region during a mega-event and comparing this performance to other similar regions at 
the same time that did not host the event. Alternatively, one can compare a city’s economy 
during a mega-event to the same city before and/or after the event. Scholars most commonly use 
personal income, per capita personal income, employment, and taxable sales or sales tax 
collections in their studies, although economic variables such as hotel occupancy rates and 
prices, and airport arrivals and departures have also been used to attempt to measure the 
economic impact of mega-events on host economies.  
  The primary difficulty facing practitioners of ex post economic impact analysis is that 
even significant economic events may be hard to isolate within the large, diverse metropolitan 
economies in which they take place. For example, even if the Super Bowl does result in a $400 
million boost to the host city, this is less than 0.1% of the annual personal income of a 
metropolitan area like Los Angeles, a frequent Super Bowl host. Any income gains as a result of   15
the game may be obscured by normal fluctuations in the region’s economy. If the event can be 
isolated within space and time, however, any potential impact is more likely to be identified. For 
example, while the presence of the World Series might have a large effect on neighborhood 
businesses, the overall effect on a state or country’s economy will be minuscule and hard to 
identify. Furthermore, these same economic effects may be large for the time period immediately 
surrounding the event, but over the course of an entire year, the impact during this, perhaps, 
week-long period is not likely to show up as an important change. Therefore, the use of quarterly 
or monthly data is superior to annual data, and city, county, or metropolitan area data is preferred 
to state or national figures. In addition, if one can examine multiple events, or the same event 
over a number of years, patterns that are not be evident when observing an individual event may 
be revealed. 
  While the earliest studies of the economic impact of professional sports concentrated on 
the presence of professional franchises and the construction of new playing facilities (e.g. Robert 
Baade and Richard Dye
31 and Coates and Humphreys
32), more recently work has begun to focus 
on the economic impact of mega-events on local economies. See Table 2 for a summary of 
multiple ex post mega-event impact studies. 
   Robert Baade and Victor Matheson examine annual city-wide employment data during 
MLB’s All-Star Game and find that employment growth in host cities between 1973 and 1997 
was 0.38% lower than expected compared to other cities
33. A similar examination of the 1996 
Summer Olympics in Atlanta by the same authors found employment growth of between 3,500 
and 42,000 jobs, a fraction of 77,000 new jobs claimed in ex ante studies
34. An examination of 
metropolitan area-wide personal income during thirty NCAA Men’s Final Four Basketball 
tournaments found that, on average, personal incomes were lower in host cities during   16
tournament years
35. A similar study of the 1994 World Cup in the U.S. found that personal 
income in host cities was $4 billion lower than predicted, a direct contradiction to ex ante 
estimates of a $4 billion windfall
36. Coates and Humphreys examine the effect of post-season 
play in all four major U.S. sports on per capita personal incomes and find in all cases that hosting 
playoff games has a statistically insignificant impact on per capita incomes
37.  Finally, Baade and 
Matheson examined 32 Super Bowls held between 1970 and 2001 and found that the average 
increase in personal incomes in host cities was $91.9 million, roughly one-quarter of the figures 
routinely touted by the NFL, and that an increase in personal incomes due to the game of greater 
than $300 million could be ruled out at the 5% significance level
38. 
  Taxable sales or sales tax collections have also frequently been used to assess the 
economic impact of sporting events. These measures are ideally suited to measuring the 
economic impact of large sporting events for several reasons. First, there is often a direct 
connection between sales tax collections and sporting events or facilities. Boosters often include 
large sums for visitor spending in their ex ante estimates of the economic impact of a event, and 
numerous publicly funded sports facilities have also been financed directly from sales taxes 
collections or through specific increases in the sales tax rate making an examination of taxable 
sales especially relevant
39. In addition, taxable sales are a good indicator of economic well-being 
as they represent approximately 40 percent of overall economic activity. Finally, the previously 
mentioned studies of mega-events have used personal income
40, 41, per capita income
42, or 
employment data
43, 44 to estimate the ex post economic impact of sports. These data are generally 
available only annually and at the county or metropolitan area level, and therefore these studies 
suffer from the limitations mentioned previously. Taxable sales data, however, are often 
published either monthly or quarterly and can cover areas down to the city level or smaller.   17
Therefore, these data can be analyzed to identify activities that are much smaller in scale and 
duration.  
  Phil Porter provides a detailed analysis of taxable sales with respect to mega-events, 
using regression analysis to determine that the economic impact of the Super Bowl was 
statistically insignificant, that is not measurably different from zero. After reviewing short-term 
data on sales receipts for several Super Bowls, Porter concluded:  
Investigator bias, data measurement error, changing production relationships, 
diminishing returns to both scale and variable inputs, and capacity constraints 
anywhere along the chain of sales relations lead to lower multipliers. Crowding 
out and price increases by input suppliers in response to higher levels of demand 
and the tendency of suppliers to lower prices to stimulate sales when demand is 
weak lead to overestimates of net new sales due to the event. These characteristics 
alone would suggest that the estimated impact of the mega-sporting event will be 
lower than the impact analysis predicts. When there are perfect complements to 
the event, like hotel rooms for visitors, with capacity constraints [benefits are] 
reduced to zero. 
 
  Other studies relying on taxable sales have also been made. Baade and Matheson 
challenged an NFL claim of a $670 million boost in South Florida’s taxable sales due to the 1999 
Super Bowl and arrive at a figure of a mere $37 million increase
45. Baade and Matheson also 
examined taxable sales in California to determine the effect of MLB’s All-Star Game on local 
economies. They found that the three California cities that hosted All-Star Games between 1985   18
and 1997 suffered an average drop in taxable sales of roughly $30 million in the quarter in which 
the game took place
46. 
  Other more recent studies have examined multiple events in both Florida
47 and Texas
48, 49 
using taxable sales and gross sales/sales taxes collections, respectively. As in previous papers, 
the authors find no consistently positive statistically significant relationship between mega-
events and either retail sales or sales tax collections.  
 Only  one  ex post mega-event analysis has identified significant economic benefits from a 
mega-event. Julie Hotchkiss, Robert Moore, and Stephanie Zobay, in a retrospective study of the 
1996 Atlanta Olympics, estimated that the Games resulted in an increase in employment of 
293,000 jobs in areas that hosted events, a figure that exceeded even the optimistic projections of 
the event organizers
50. A more careful look at their results, however, points at the difficulty of 
identifying mega-events in the grand scheme of overall metropolitan area economic 
development. The authors found that employment growth in Atlanta and the surrounding area 
was a mere 0.2 percent higher than would have otherwise been expected over the time period 
from 1991 through 1996. If this higher growth over the entire period is attributed solely to the 
presence of the Olympics, then indeed job growth was 293,000 jobs higher than would have 
otherwise been observed. Even slight changes in large economies over long time periods, 
however, can result in eye-popping numbers. While it is certainly possible that the Summer 
Olympics were responsible for these employment gains, the study also serves as a cautionary tale 
against extrapolating small changes over large areas and time periods.  
 
Policy Recommendations and Conclusions   19
  While sports boosters routinely claim large benefits from hosting mega-events, the 
overwhelming majority of independent academic studies of these events have shown that their 
economic impact appears to be limited. While the gross impact of these huge games and 
tournaments is undoubted large, attracting tens or hundreds of thousands of live spectators as 
well as television audiences that can reach the billions, the net impact of mega-events on real 
economic variables such as taxable sales, employment, personal income, and per capita personal 
income in host cities is negligible. There are ways, however, that host cities can work to 
maximize the net benefits that accrue to the area.  
  First, by limiting the amount of new infrastructure built to accommodate an event, costs 
can be substantially reduced significantly increasing the probability that an event will result in 
positive net benefits. The local government of Montreal built multiple new facilities for the 1976 
Summer Olympics, including the grandiose Olympic Stadium, and wound up with debts totaling 
$1.2 billion. These debts were not paid off until 30 years after the Games. In contrast, the 1984 
Los Angeles Olympic Committee exclusively used existing sports venues around the city, spent 
less than $1 billion in total to put on the Games, and ended up with a profit of over $200 
million
51.  
  Second, while academic economists are nearly universal in their criticism that specialized 
sports infrastructure does little to promote economic growth, mega-events often spur spending on 
non-sports related infrastructure that may provide for future economic development. Only a 
fraction of Beijing’s $22 billion in infrastructure improvements planned for the 2008 Summer 
Olympics will be spent on sports facilities, for example. A mega-event may prompt otherwise 
reluctant public officials into making needed improvements in general infrastructure.    20
  On the other side of the coin, there is, of course, no reason to believe that general 
infrastructure improvements necessarily increase economic growth. Even infrastructure that is 
not directly sports related may go unused after the completion of the event, or may be a second-
best use of scarce investment capital
52. Furthermore, the separation between what is “sports” 
infrastructure and what is “general” infrastructure is not always clear. The new Wembley 
stadium in London was originally slated to cost around $500 million.  In addition, over $150 
million in “general” infrastructure improvements were proposed at the same time including new 
roads and a completely renovated Underground station. Without the presence of Wembley 
Stadium, however, no new roads or subway station would be required.  Therefore, from a 
objective standpoint, the entire $650 million price tag should be considered specialized sports 
infrastructure, and an analysis of the expenditure would likely lead to a negative appraisal of its 
economic benefit
53. 
  A third item that local officials should keep in mind is that there are several reasons to 
believe that hosting a series of smaller events may result in higher net benefits than a strategy 
that encourages large, but infrequent mega-events. First, crowding out is much less likely to 
occur during a small event than during a mega-event. It is difficult to believe that large numbers 
of travelers will fundamentally change their travel plans due to a relatively minor event such as a 
local marathon or amateur track and field event, and therefore these events may get all of the 
benefits of increased visitor spending without the costs of displaced visitors. Second, since 
smaller events are less likely to cause deviations from normal business patterns, the multipliers 
applied for these events are also much more likely to represent an accurate estimate of indirect 
spending. Third, while security measures cannot be ignored for these smaller events, the security 
costs and the local inconveniences caused by toughened security measures will be orders of   21
magnitude lower than for mega-events. Fourth, lower profile events are less likely to place 
additional demands on local organizers such as state-of-the-art facilities and first-class 
accommodations for athletes and organizers raising the costs of the hosting. Finally, mega-events 
simply require larger (and consequently more expensive) sporting facilities that are likely to be 
little used in future. Quite simply put, mega-events cause overinvestment in rarely used sports 
facilities
54. 
  The most important piece of advice that a local government can take regarding mega-
events, however, is simply to view with caution any economic impact estimates provided by 
entities with a incentive to provide inflated benefit figures. While most sports boosters claim that 
mega-events provide host cites with large economic returns, these same boosters present these 
figures as justification for receiving substantial public subsidies for hosting the games. The vast 
majority of independent academic studies of mega-events show the benefits to be a fraction of 
those claimed by event organizers.    22
Endnotes 
                                                           
1. National Football League, “Super Bowl XXXIII Generates $396 Million for South Florida,” 
NFL Report, 58, no. 7 (1999). 
2. Bud Selig, J. Harrington,  and Healey, “New Ballpark Press Briefing: July 12, 1999,” 
www.asapsports.com/baseball/1999allstar/071299BS.html, (accessed August 29, 2000).  
3. Dan Ackman, “In Money Terms, The Subway Series Strikes Out,”  Forbes Magazine, October 
21, 2000.  
4. T. Anderson, “St. Louis Ready to Raise NCAA Flag if Atlanta Can’t,” St. Louis Business 
Journal, January 19, 2001. 
5. M. Mensheha, “Home-court Edge: Final Four Promises to be Economic Slam Dunk,” San 
Antonio Business Journal, March 27, 1998. 
6. Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “Home Run or Wild Pitch? Assessing the Economic 
Impact of Major League Baseball’s All-Star Game,” Journal of Sports Economics, 2, no. 4 
(2001): 307-327.  
7. Jeffrey Humphreys, “The Economic Impact of Hosting Super Bowl XXVIII on Georgia,” 
Georgia Business and Economic Conditions, 54, no. 3 (May-June, 1994). 
8. United States Tennis Association, “2000 U.S. Open Nets Record $420 Million in Economic 
Benefits for New York,” www.usta.com/pagesup/news12494.html, (accessed January 9, 2002). 
9. South Africa Football Association, “World Cup Bid Details,” 
www.safa.ord.za/html/bid_det.htm (accessed January 9, 2002). 
10. Jonathan Finer, “The grand illusion,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 7, (March 2002): 32–
36. 
11. J. Houck, “High-stake Courtship,” FoxSportsBiz.com, January 21, 2000. 
www.foxsports.com/business/trends/z000120allstar1.sml, (accessed September 14, 2000). 
12. Knight Ridder News Service, “Final Four’s Financial Impact Hard to Gauge,” Enquirer 
Sports Coverage, enquirer.com/editions/1999/03/25/spt_final_fours.html, March 25, 1999, 
(accessed August 30, 2001).  
13. Patrick Anderson, Business Economics and Finance with MATLAB, GIS and Simulation 
Models, (New York: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2004), 131.  
14.  Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “Mega-Sporting Events in Developing Countries: 
Playing the Way to Prosperity?” South African Journal of Economics,  72, no. 5 (December 
2004): 1084-1095.   23
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15. Robert Baade, “Professional Sports as a Catalyst for Metropolitan Economic Development,” 
Journal of Urban Affairs, 18, no. 1 (1996): 1-17.  
16. Dennis Coates and Brad Humphreys, “The Growth Effects of Sports Franchises, Stadia, and 
Arenas,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 14, no. 4 (1999): 601-624. 
17. Phil Porter, “Mega-Sports Events as Municipal Investments: A Critique of Impact Analysis,” 
in Sports Economics: Current Research, eds John Fizel, Elizabeth Gustafson, and Larry Hadley, 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1999). 
18. Dennis Coates and Brad Humphreys, “The Economic Impact of Post-Season Play in 
Professional Sports,” Journal of Sports Economics, 3, no. 3 (2002): 291-299.  
19. Victor Matheson, “Contrary Evidence on the Economic Impact of the Super Bowl on the 
Victorious City,” Journal of Sports Economics, 6, no. 4 (2005): 420-428. 
20. Gerald Carlino and N. Edward Coulson, “Compensating differentials and the social benefits 
of the NFL,” Journal of Urban Economics, 56, no. 1 (2004): 25-50. 
21. Dennis Coates, Brad Humphreys and Andrew Zimbalist, “Compensating differentials and the 
social benefits of the NFL: A comment,” Journal of Urban Economics, 60, no. 1 (2006): 124-
131. 
22. John Seigfried and Andrew Zimbalist, “The Economics of Sports Facilities and Their 
Communities,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, no. 3 (2000): 95-114. 
23. M. Golovnina, “S. Korean tourism sector in blues despite World Cup,” Forbes.com, 
http://www.forbes.com/newswire/2002/06/19/rtr636036.html, posted 6/19/2002 (accessed 
6/20/2002).  
24. Victor Matheson, “Economic Multipliers and Mega-Event Analysis,” College of the Holy 
Cross Working Paper Series, no. 04-02 (2004). 
25. Matheson, “Economic Multipliers and Mega-Event Analysis.” 
26.Robert Baade, Victor Matheson, and Mimi Nikolova, “A Tale of Two Stadiums: Comparing 
the Economic Impact of Chicago’s Wrigley Field and U.S. Cellular Field,” Geographische 
Rundschau International Edition, 3, no. 2 (April 2007). 
27. Seigfried and Zimbalist. 
28. Dennis Coates, “Tax Benefits of Hosting the Super Bowl and MLB All-Star Game,” 
International Journal of Sport Finance,” forthcoming. 
29. Soonhwan Lee, “A Review of Economic Impact Study on Sport Events,” The Sport Journal, 
4, no. 2 (2001).   24
                                                                                                                                                                                           
30. Larry Dwyer, Peter Forsyth, Ray Spurr, “Estimating the Impacts of Special Events on an 
Economy,” Journal of Travel Research, 43, (May 2005): 1-9. 
31. Robert Baade and Richard Dye, “The Impact of Stadiums and Professional Sports on 
Metropolitan Area Development,” Growth and Change, 21, no. 2 (1990): 1-14. 
32. Coates and Humphreys, “The Growth Effects of Sports Franchises, Stadia, and Arenas.” 
33. Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “Home Run or Wild Pitch?” 
34. Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “Bidding for the Olympics: Fool’s Gold?” in 
Transatlantic Sport: The Comparative Economics of North American and European Sports, eds 
Carlos Pestanos Barros, Muradali Ibrahimo, and Stefan Szymanski, (London: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2002), 127-151.  
35. Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “An Economic Slam Dunk or March Madness? 
Assessing the Economic Impact of the NCAA Basketball Tournament,” in Economics of College 
Sports, eds John Fizel and Rodney Fort, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 111-133.  
36. Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “The Quest for the Cup: Assessing the Economic Impact 
of the World Cup,” Regional Studies, 38, no. 4 (2004): 341-352.  
37. Coates and Humphreys, “The Economic Impact of Post-Season Play in Professional Sports”. 
38. Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “Padding Required:  Assessing the Economic Impact of 
the Super Bowl,” European Sports Management Quarterly, 6, no. 4 (December 2006). 
39. Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “Have Public Finance Principles Been Shut Out in 
Financing New Stadiums for the NFL?” Public Finance and Management, 6, no. 3 (Summer 
2006): 284-320. 
40. Baade and Matheson, “The Quest for the Cup”. 
41. Baade and Matheson, “An Economic Slam Dunk or March Madness?” 
42. Coates and Humphreys, “The Economic Impact of Post-Season Play in Professional Sports”. 
43.  Baade and Matheson, “Home Run or Wild Pitch?” 
44.  Baade and Matheson, “Bidding for the Olympics: Fool’s Gold?” 
45.  Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “An Assessment of the Economic Impact of the 
American Football Championship, the Super Bowl, on Host Communities,” Reflets et 
Perspectives, 34, no. 2-3 (2000): 35-46. 
46. Baade and Matheson, “Home Run or Wild Pitch?”   25
                                                                                                                                                                                           
47. Robert Baade, Robert Baumann, and Victor Matheson, “Selling the Big Game:  Measuring 
the Economic Impact of Mega-Events Through Taxable Sales,” College of the Holy Cross 
Working Paper Series, no. 05-10 (2005). 
48. Dennis Coates, “Tax Benefits of Hosting the Super Bowl and MLB All-Star Game.” 
49. Dennis Coates and Craig Depken, II, “Mega-Events: Is the Texas-Baylor game to Waco what 
the Super Bowl is to Houston?” International Association of Sports Economists, Working Paper 
no. 06-06 (2006).  
50. Julie Hotchkiss, Robert E. Moore, and Stephanie M. Zobay, “Impact of the 1996 Summer 
Olympic Games on Employment and Wages in Georgia,” Southern Economic Journal, 69, no. 3 
(2003): 691-704. 
51. Holger Preuss, Economics of the Olympic Games, Edward Elgar Publishing 2004. 
52. Baade and Matheson, “Mega-Sporting Events in Developing Countries”. 
53. Baade and Matheson, “Mega-Sporting Events in Developing Countries”. 
54. Victor Matheson, “Is Smaller Better?  A Comment on ‘Comparative Economic Impact 
Analyses’ by Michael Mondello and Patrick Rishe,” Economic Development Quarterly, 20, no. 2 
(May 2006): 192-195.   26










































































Comptroller of New York City
5 
 
NCAA Men=s Final 

























































































B.C. Ministry of Competition, 





                                                 
1. Jeffrey Humphreys, “The Economic Impact of Hosting Super Bowl XXVIII on Georgia,” 
Georgia Business and Economic Conditions, 54, no. 3 (May-June, 1994). 
2. National Football League, “Super Bowl XXXIII Generates $396 Million for South Florida,” 
NFL Report, 58, no. 7 (1999).   27
                                                                                                                                                             
3. National Football League, “Super Bowl XXXVII generates $367 million economic impact on 
San Diego County,” http://www.nfl.com/news/story/6371262, May 14, 2003, (accessed October 
15, 2006). 
4. Bud Selig, J. Harrington, and J. Healey, “New Ballpark Press Briefing: July 12, 1999,” 
www.asapsports.com/baseball/1999allstar/071299BS.html, (accessed August 29, 2000).  
5. Dan Ackman, “In Money Terms, The Subway Series Strikes Out,” Forbes Magazine, October 
21, 2000.  
6. T. Anderson, “St. Louis Ready to Raise NCAA Flag if Atlanta Can=t,” St. Louis Business 
Journal, January 19, 2001. 
7. United States Tennis Association, “2000 U.S. Open Nets Record $420 Million in Economic 
Benefits for New York,” www.usta.com/pagesup/news12494.html, (accessed January 9, 2002). 
8. Jonathan Finer, “The grand illusion,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 7, (March 2002): 32B36. 
9. Finer. 
10. South Africa Football Association, “World Cup Bid Details,” 
www.safa.ord.za/html/bid_det.htm (accessed January 9, 2002). 
11. Jeffrey Humphreys and M. K. Plummer, “The Economic Impact on the State of Georgia of 
Hosting the 1996 Summer Olympic Games,” (Athens, Georgia: Selig Center for Economic 
Growth, The University of Georgia, 1995). 
 
12. InterVISTAS Consulting, “The Economic Impact of the 2010 Winter Olympics and 
Paralympic Games: An Update,” (British Columbia Ministry of Competition, Science and 
Enterprise, November 20, 2002).   28

















































Julie Hotchkiss, Robert 










3,500 - 42,000 
jobs 
 

























































down $4 billion 
 


























$32 - $49 
million 
 

























million (avg)  
 
Robert Baade, Rob 



























Varied - pos. 
and neg. 
 















Marc Lavoie and Gabriel 
Rodriguez
15   29
 
 
                                                 
1. Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “Home Run or Wild Pitch? Assessing the Economic 
Impact of Major League Baseball’s All-Star Game,” Journal of Sports Economics, 2, no. 4 
(2001): 307-327.  
2. Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “An Assessment of the Economic Impact of the American 
Football Championship, the Super Bowl, on Host Communities,” Reflets et Perspectives, 34, no. 
2-3 (2000): 35-46. 
3. Julie Hotchkiss, Robert E. Moore, and Stephanie M. Zobay, “Impact of the 1996 Summer 
Olympic Games on Employment and Wages in Georgia,” Southern Economic Journal, 69, no. 3 
(2003): 691-704. 
4. Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “Bidding for the Olympics: Fool=s Gold?” in 
Transatlantic Sport: The Comparative Economics of North American and European Sports, eds 
Carlos Pestanos Barros, Muradali Ibrahimo, and Stefan Szymanski, (London: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2002), 127-151.  
5. Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “Padding Required:  Assessing the Economic Impact of 
the Super Bowl,”  European Sports Management Quarterly, 6, no. 4 (December 2006). 
6. Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “A Fall Classic? The Economic Impact of the World 
Series,” International Journal of Sport Management and Marketing, forthcoming. 
7. Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “An Economic Slam Dunk or March Madness? Assessing 
the Economic Impact of the NCAA Basketball Tournament,” in Economics of College Sports, 
eds John Fizel and Rodney Fort, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 111-133.  
8. Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “The Quest for the Cup: Assessing the Economic Impact 
of the World Cup,” Regional Studies, 38, no. 4 (2004): 341-352.  
9. Dennis Coates and Brad Humphreys, “The Economic Impact of Post-Season Play in 
Professional Sports,” Journal of Sports Economics, 3, no. 3 (2002): 291-299.  
10. Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “High Octane? Grading the Economic Impact of the 
Daytona 500,” Marquette Sports Law Journal, 10, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 401-415. 
11. Phil Porter, “Mega-Sports Events as Municipal Investments: A Critique of Impact Analysis,” 
in Sports Economics: Current Research, eds John Fizel, Elizabeth Gustafson, and Larry Hadley, 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1999). 
12. Robert Baade, Robert Baumann, and Victor Matheson, “Selling the Big Game:  Measuring 
the Economic Impact of Mega-Events Through Taxable Sales,” College of the Holy Cross 
Working Paper Series, no. 05-10 (2005).   30
                                                                                                                                                             
13. Dennis Coates, “Tax Benefits of Hosting the Super Bowl and MLB All-Star Game,” 
International Journal of Sport Finance, forthcoming. 
14. Dennis Coates and Craig Depken, II, “Mega-Events: Is the Texas-Baylor game to Waco what 
the Super Bowl is to Houston?,” International Association of Sports Economists, Working Paper 
no. 06-06 (2006).  
15. Marc Lavoie and Gabriel Rodríguez, “The Economic Impact of Professional Teams on 
Monthly Hotel Occupancy Rates of Canadian Cities: A Box-Jenkins Approach,” Journal of 
Sports Economics, 6, no. 3 (2005): 314-324. 